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The root of the concept of monopoly capital is 
Hilferding's pioneering book,Finance Capital, completed in 
1909, in which Hilferding aimed to develop Marx's analysis 
of the processes of concentration and centralization, and of 
the roles of competition and credit within these processes. 
According to Hilferding, a twofold transformation in its economic 
appearance gives capitalism the form of finance capital. This 
transformation is the outcome of processes which tended, on the 
one hand, to abolish competition through the formation of 
cartels and trusts, and on the other, to promote increasingly 
intimate relations between banking capital and industrial 
capital, within which banking capital becomes the dominant 
partner. The construction of the concept of finance capital is 
the object of the first three parts of Hilferding's book. The 
fourth part analyzes economic crises. There, disproportionalities 
between sectors of production and the problem of realization 
of surplus value are identified as major causes of capitalist 
crises, or alternatively as aspects of competition through which 
crises should manifest themselves. Hilferding also maintained 
that to the extent that cartels and trusts intervene in the 
mechanisms of price formation, they reinforce the tendency 
toward crises. Those four parts of the book form the theoretical 
portion of Finance Capital. Finally, in the fifth part, 
Hilferding discusses the economic policy of finance capital 
and develops a theory of capitalist imperialism. 
In building up his theory of finance capital and crises, 
however, Hilferding treated the concepts of competition, credit, 
and accumulation of capital in a very sketchy way.
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According to Hilferding, the processes of capital con- 
centration and centralization through the formation and diffusion of cartels 
and trusts. These carbinations of capital would constitute the major 
instruments for the promotion of price increases and originate 
differential profit rates.Rates of profit would rise in 
cartelized and trustified branches, whereas they would fall in 
those branches that did not benefit from such capital 
unifications with monopolistic aims. As a result of the progres- 
sive elimination of competition prices would no longer be 
objectively determined magnitudes, and an arbitrary and incidental 
component would progressively prevail in their determination. The 
law of value would therefore be gradually weakened. 
In the argument developed by Hilferding there are no 
absolute limits to the process of monopolization. On the contrary, 
there is a constant tendency toward an expansion of cartelization 
whereby independent industries are progressively subordinated to 
cartelized industries, the ultimate result of this process being 
the formation of a general cartel. In this general cartel 
capitalist production would be consciously regulated by a central 
agency that would determine both the volume and the distribution 
of production. 
This presentation of the processes that lead to the 
elimination of competition would be incomplete if we did not 
take into consideration the influence that ' according to 
Hilferding,* the oredit provided by banks exercises upon them 
The pr i processes of banking concentration originate in 
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the concentration of industrial capital. However, in Hilferding's 
view, from a certain point.of their evolution onwards banking 
capital would become the decisive influence on the continuity of 
concentration processes toward more advanced stages. This would 
be so because, by absorbing the different modalities of credit 
as part of its operation - commercial credit, capital credit, and 
corporation promotion - banking capital would come to exercise 
control over the financing of industrial corporations and from 
that point on would dominate the reproduction and monopoli- 
zation of industrial capital. For Hilferding, therefore, banking 
domination over industry and the progressive elimination of 
competition are articulated and complementary phenomena. It is 
from this articulation that Hilferding deduces his concept of 
finance capital. 
Banking domination over industry constitutes, according 
to Hilferding, a mature expression of the relationships that may 
be observed between money capital and productive capital in the 
circuit of industrial capital. This domination is said to occur 
especially because banking capital predominantly takes on a more 
liquid form than industrial capital, and because in the competi- 
tive struggle among themselves individual industrial capitals 
become increasingly dependent upon external sources of financing 
to expand production scales and reduce costs. Hence, in making 
use of capital credit to finance their formation of fixed capital, 
industrial capitalists are compelled to submit to banker's 
supervision. Their dependence is said to increase if they associate 
in the promotion of corporations as their successful access to 
capital markets can then only be had through the intermediacy of
4 . 
banks. So, whether owing to the Links of long-term loans, to the 
ownership of the shareholding capital of industrial corporations, 
or to its participation in the boards of the latter, banking 
capital would come to be the dominant partner in that integration 
of the different fractions of capital embodied in finan
ce capital. 
rn 
Finally, given their inherent aversion to the 
risks of competition, 
both in the industrial sphere 
and in the banking one, large 
banks 
would be led to form a central bank tha
t would take charge of 
credit distribution and thus of the 
determination of the 
a 
volume and allocation of social production. 
The central bank an 
the general cartel would theref
ore be the final manifestations
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classical book may be regarded as the seminal work of an influ- 
ential school of modern economists which distinguishes different 
stages in capitalist development: the stage of free competition 
and the stage of monopoly capitalism.The latter is said to ori- 
ginate in the structural changes undergone by capitalism as of 
the late nineteenth century, which would have produced qualitative 
modifications in its essential laws. Outstanding in this school 
of economic thought are Sweezy and Baran (1966), Sweezy (1976, 
1977, 1981), Mandel (1968), Dobb (1972), Steindl (1976), and 
Boccara (1977), among many others. Baran and Sweezy (1966), for 
instance, argue that Hilferding was the first author to attempt 
to incorporate monopoly into the body of Marx's theory, but did 
not go so far as to treat monopoly as a qualitatively new 
element in capitalist economy, and that “he saw it as effecting 
essentially quantitative modifications of the basic Marxian laws 
of capitalism." The massive influence of Hilferding's theory, 
along with the fact that in most of these works the treatment 
of the concept of finance capital has been rather superficial 
and uncritical, make it essential to debate the 
basic tenets that support it. 
Hilferding's analysis of the processes of capital 
concentration and centralization, as well as his conclusions, 
are based on a poor and confused understanding of Marx's theory. 
Both capital concentration and centralization are erroneously 
associated to the elimination of competition and banking domi- 
nation over industry. 
At the roots of Hilferding's procedure we find, in the
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first place, his identification of Marx's conception of compe- 
tition with the orthodox conception of pure and perfect competi- 
tion, which in turn is viewed as an adequate interpretation of 
the reality of competition among capitals until the late 
nineteenth century. As a corollary, the concept of monopolistic 
combines and finance capital (of imperfect competition or oligo- 
poly, as suggested by later economists who share ideas resembling 
Hilferding's) becomes an adequate signpost to characterize what 
are said to be the new modalities of interaction among individual 
capitals. 
In Hilferding's concept of competition emphasis is 
laid on the large number of small capitals, the absence of 
collusion, the free mobility of capital among the various 
industries, and the notion that each enterprise plays a passive 
role as price taker in the process of price determination. 
These are all basic elements of the concept of pure or perfect 
competition. When once this trivial conception is mistaken for 
Marx's, a whole number of phenomena of competition - which are 
necessary in the light of the latter's theory ~ begin to be 
viewed by Hilferding as part of a process of generalized monopo= 
lization. This is particularly clear in the case of the diffe- 
rentiation of profit rates, Marx's conception regards that 
differentiation as a necessary aspect in the tendential process 
of equalization of the rates of profit on capital in different 
industries, as well as necessary within each industry ’ given the 
co-existence of several preduction methods and several levels of 
efficiency in the use of each method, Yet, as this differentiation 
contradicts the conception of pure or perfect competition, the 
’   
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very same differentiation is turned into an evidence of the 
expanding monopolistic power. 
In Marx's conception, the nature of competition is 
given by the fact that it constitutes a struggle between capitals 
in their processes of self-expansion, or an “arms race", to use 
Shaikh's analogy. This arms race contains two aspects. In the 
first place there are the struggles between capitalists in one 
and the same industry, which result in the determination of a 
uniform market price for each commodity and presuppose a regulat- 
ing value as a center of gravity around which market prices 
fluctuate. This confrontation between capitalists within the 
same industry is equivalent to a war within one and the same 
field, or to a war for the occupation of that field. Furthermore, 
the development of new means of production is equivalent to an 
arms race inwhich the development of new weapons consists 
chiefly of the ability to reduce costs and subjugate competitors. ° 
In the second place, there are’ struggles between capitals from 
different industries, i.e., a war among different industries. 
Different industries mean different battlefields. This confron- 
tation occurs through both the inflow and outflow of capital in 
different industries whereby a tendency toward the equalization of 
profit rates in the inflow and outflow of capital in different 
industries whereby a tendency toward the equalization of profit 
rates in the various spheres of production is created. When the 
prospects of gains are high in a given field, this stimulates a 
displacement of armies toward that area. In other words, capital 
mobility is analogous to the mobility of war forces. As a 
result, the concept of a center of gravity for prices takes on a
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a new determination in the form of production prices. 
Both these aspects of competition - intraindustrial 
ané interindustrial - give rise te the existence of differential 
rates of profit at each point of time. However, Hilferding 
disregards, first of all,’the aspects of competition among indi- 
vidual capitals in one and the same industry, and therefore the 
inevitability of differential profit rates arising from distinct 
levels of productivity of the labor absorbed by different capitals 
within each industry. Secondly, Hilferding conceives of competi- 
tion among different industries as a process in which production 
prices are real equilibrium prices and not an average of past 
movements. Consequently, the differentials in the rate of profit 
resulting from the fact that supply and demand never coincide and 
that distinct industries present different turnover periods in 
their capital are not perceived as part of the theory of compe- 
tition in Marx. 
The problem of the differentiation between rates of 
, Profit provoked by the competition among capitals from distinct 
industries cannot be mistaken for the differentiation of profit 
rates resulting from competition within each industrial branch 
Yet, it is necessary to understand both 4S processes that are 
complementary to and articulated with one another. As a result of 
their articulation we must realize that the abstract notion of 
production prices holds in itself the differences beteween i : : : ndividual production prices, average Production prices, and , regulating production prices, The latter are the centers of 
ravi 
i 
g ty of market prices and represent a transformation of the   
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concept of center of gravity initially defined at the level of 
each industry, when the problem of the tendential equalization 
of the rate of profit of different industries as part of the 
materialization of the notion of value still had not been intro~ 
duced. This center of gravity now redefined represents the price 
resulting from the production method that is most accessible to 
the new capital being invested. This inflow of new capital is 
what pushes prices down as this is where supply is expanded. 
The inflow of additional capital is interrupted at the point 
where the rate of profit of this requlating capital approaches 
the average rate of profit. Thus, the tendency toward an equal- 
ization of profit rates is expressed as a tendential equalization 
of the profit rates only on the regulating capital in each industry. 
In other words, that tendency implies that the hierarchy of the 
rates of profit of a given industrial branch, generally speaking, 
follows the fluctuations in the regulting price for that industry. 
In short, as the tendency toward an equalization of the 
rates of profit among different industries is applicable only in 
the case of regulating capital, the hierarchy of profit rates 
within each industry is a typical phenomenon of competition. On 
the other hand, as the equalization of the rates of profit of 
different industries is processed only as a tendency and expresses 
itself as an average of past movements, there will be, at any 
specific point in time, differential rates of profit between the 
regulating capitals of different industrial branches. 
Therefore, Marx's conception of competition, in which 
the dispersion of the rates of profit emerges as a necessary
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actual result, is perfectly in keeping with his theory of value 
and production prices. And what is more, it is his theory 
of 
value, as a necessary general principle, that confere intelligi- 
bility upon competition among capitals and defines the limits 
within which the process of determination of market prices will 
condition the reproduction of social capital. 
Hilferding's analysis of the processes of capital con- 
centration and centralization is based, in the second place, on 
a double misunderstanding concerning the credit system. On the 
one hand, fa mistakes the relationships between the functions of 
- interest-bearing capital and the functions of industrial capital, 
which are conditioned by capital movement as a whole, for the 
relationships between the forms of banking capital and industrial 
capital as they have manifested themselves for a short while 
in some branches of heavy industry in Germany's late industriali- 
zation. On the other hand, Hilferding adopts a functionalist 
conception of credit according to which the financing of capital 
accumulation endows banks with the power to regulate financial 
_and monetary circulation as well as the very competition among 
capitals. Consequently, a complete reversal is produced in the 
meaning of the diffusion of the corporate system and the finan-. 
cial accumulation of capital. These cease to express the growing 
and complete subordination of interest-bearing to the industrial 
capital's functions of producing and appropriating surplus value, 
and become elements in capitalist economy's march towards a 
conscious regulation by a small group of financial Capitalists. 
Contrary to Hilferding's assertions, the dominant partner 
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in the relationships between industrial capital and interest- 
-bearing capital is industrial capital. The subordination of 
interest-bearing capital to industrial capital flaws from the 
fact that in the capitalist mode of production, interest is deter- 
mined by surplus value and profit. These nust be sufficiently 
large to allow a fraction of themselves to be appropriated as 
interest. In other words, the difference between the enterprise's 
profit and the interest rate expresses the difference 
between a moneyed class of capitalists and an industrial class 
of capitalists. However, this double existence os the capitalist 
class presupposes a divergence in the surplus value produced by 
capital. The different functions of credit - equalization of the 
profit rate among capitals from different industries, reduction 
in circulation costs, promotion of corporations, and an increased 
control of individual capitalists over the capital of the 
remaining capitalists - must then be jointly understood as an 
instrument for the development of capitalist production. 
Even if we assume the diffusion of the corporate system, 
which is in turn a component part of the generalization of the 
financial form of capital accumulation or accumulation of finan- 
cial assets the functions of interest-bearing capital will 
continue to lie entirely within the M - M' circuit. That circuit 
is consequently positioned at the intersection of two different 
connections: on the one hand, its functional subordination to 
industrial capital, and on the other, its relative autonomy in 
regard to the latter, given that it has its own specific movement, 
That specific movement restricts itself neither to the
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purely technical movements performed by money in the circulation 
process of industrial and commercial capitals nor to the financing 
o£ capitalist accumulation, both of which originate banking capi-~ 
tal. A second aspect of the movement of interest-bearing capital 
is financial circulation (and the resulting liquidity of bank 
capital), which allows its valorization process not to be direc- 
tly limited by the action of the law of value. Given, however, 
that this valorization rests-upon speculation, hence upon the 
erratic circulation of money capital, dissociated from the 
reproduction of industrial capital, a good deal of instability 
is characteristic of financial circulation. Furthermore, when 
the pace of accumulation of financial assets ceases to be sanc- 
tioned by the actual conditions of production of surplus value 
by industrial capital, financial difficulties come up and 
challenge the relations of credit and the monetary system, 
This element of instability in financial circulation 
shows the contradictory character of credit in capitalist 
production. Banks are periodically subject to suspicion on the 
art of their depositors and thus call for an intervention by 
the monetary authority an@/or the state in the capacity 
lender of last resort. 
of 
The regulation of the inflow and outflow. 
of capitals in banking activity resulting thereof interrupts the opera- 
tion of scale economies and sets up restrictions to the process 
of concentration and centralization of bank capital. Hence the 
non-existence of any grounds to aprioristically Presume that 
banking concentration will progress a y 
trial 
ny faster than indus  
concentation thus making it e 'y fo 
the 
e 
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tendency toward the formation of a private central bank. 
Finally, the growing presence of external sources in 
industry financing manifest itself during certain phases os capi- 
tal accumulation where there is an intensification and generali- 
zation of a revolution in the technical conditions of poduction 
in some industrial branches. Those conditions are not sufficient 
to set up a general state of banking domination over industry. 
Therefore, not even in the most developed instance of 
the credit system, when capitals have assumed the form of 
corporations, does the relative autonomy of interest-bearing cap- 
ital ever take on the form of a synthesis through the domination 
of industrial capital by banking capital. Even in that advanced 
stage in the constitution of the capitalist mode of production, 
in following the path that leads from its production to its final 
appropriation in the form of dividends, surplus value continues 
to cross the differentiated circuits of industrial, commercial, 
and banking capital. Not only do competition and the confront- 
ation of forces between lending capitalists . and borrowing 
capitalists continue to exist, but also profits (dividends) 
continue to be appropriated at distinct institucional loci , “ees, 
by distinct groups of assiociated capitalist with a wide 
diversification in terms of the sectors of economic activity 
covered by their investments. In those economic groups (conglom- 
erates), more or less cohesively articulated as they are chiefly 
by the bonds of capital ownership, power relations express 
themselves in different hierarchies between individual capital- 
ists and allied subgroups of capitalists. Such hierarchies
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reflect variable historical conditions including state action. 
The common bond unifying those economic group is the community 
of interest among their different partners or allies. In this 
sense, some partial experiences of banking control over industrial 
enterprises, such as observed in some branches of industry and 
for variable lengths of time in Germany's late industrialization, 
represent but one of a range of possibilities of the relation- 
ship between the forms of industrial capital and bank capital. 
Hilferding's theory of crisis contains two contradictory 
conceptions about the causes of overproduction crises ana the 
periodic breakdowns in capitalist economy. one of these concep- 
tion emphasizes the occurrence of disturbances in the circulation 
or reproduction of capital as a whole, as expressed in excessive 
investment, sectorial disproportionalities, and general problems 
‘ of realization. This conception is the more elaborate one adevel-~ 
oped by Hilferding, therefore it prevails in his argument at 
large. It is also the most widespread conception, being generally 
known as theory of Hilferding about the causes of crises 
‘The other conception,: presented as it is ina sketchy and incomplete 
way, ensues from the fall in the rate of pofit provoked by 
technical progress and the increase in the organic compositi. on 
of capital. According to this conception, disproportionalities 
assert themselves only in and via competition among Capitals at als a 
the point where the tendencies towards a fall in the rat £ ate o 
profit begin to prevail over the tendencies toward an i 
ncrease 
in prices and in the mass of profit, at the end of the b 
& boom 





This ambivalent and scarcely sound formulation of the 
theory of crises, in turn, reappears in a wider incongruity 
between the theory of crises and the theory of the processes of 
capital concentration and centralization. That incongruity was 
suppressed from Hilferding's conception in the years following 
Finance Capital's original publication by means of his formulation 
of a notion of “organized capitalism". According to this new 
notion, the processes of capital concentration anda centralization 
completely eliminate crises and allow capitalist production, if 
managed by a democratic and socialist state, to become the basis 
for a peaceful, benign development that will enrich human 
society. 
According to Hilferding's first conception of crises, 
proportionality among the various sectors and branches of produc- 
tion is the sole condition for the process of reproduction of 
capital to take place without any difficulties.-Given the social 
division of labor and the private ana decentralized character 
of the decisions regarding production, the maintenance of the 
relations of proportionality that must exist in production as 
a whole depends on the operation of the price mechanism. This 
mechanism, operating through alterations in the structure of 
relative prices, determines production expansion or contraction 
in each sector or branch, i.e., the distribution of production. 
Therefore, Hilferding maintains that the disruption of 
proportional relations must find its explanation in the disruption 
of or distortion in the structure of prices, which prevents 
them from giving an adequate indication of the sectorial 
requirements of aggregate production,
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The main factor that may prevent prices from varying 
uniformly, thus bringing about disproportionalities, is the 
diversity of the organic composition of capital among sectors. 
Hilferding points out that the growth in the organic composition 
of capital attendant on the development of capital accumulation 
is differentially manifested in the various sectors and branches 
of production. This process, in turn, translates itself into a 
differential time extension, by sector and branch, of the 
maturity of the new investments, and therefore of the time 
required to expand production, The longer the time required to 
install a new productive facility, the harder it is to adjust 
supply capacity to the growing needs of personal and productive 
consumption, The wider the gap between supply capacity and 
demand, the more pronounced is the rise in prices, causing a 
relative increase in the pressure to transfer capitals into 
activities with a higher organic composition. The stimulus to 
expand investments in such activities is reinforced, in turn, by ' 
the effect of the increase in the organic composition of capital 
in terms of a rise in productivity, cost reduction, and genera 
_ tion of extra profits. Thus, as a result of the differential 
growth in the rate of profit, deriving basically from the diff er- 
ential response in supply, new flows of capital give prefere 
nce. 
to those sectors with a higher composition of capital. thi 
. s 
produces a tendency toward excessive investments and over a 
produc- 
tion in the sectors with a higher organic composition of capit Ll apita 
as compared to those with a lower one, Duisproportionalit; 
ies 
become manifest when the commoditiets Of the former secto rs reach 
the market, for the sale of these new Products is hindered 5 ered by 
the fact that production in the sectyors wi 





composition of capital has not grown at the same speed. As a 
consequence, the overproduction crisis itself is more severe in 
those sectors with a higher organic composition of capital. 
Up to this point, the foregoing conception of crisis 
is basically a new version of Tugan-Baranowsky's theory.3 Ace 
cording to this author, cutbacks initiated by accidental over- 
production in some key industries would damage sales in other 
industries and thus lead to cutbacks in the latter and so on, 
until such time as that which initially constituted a partial 
overproduction crisis becomes a general overproduction crisis. 
Hilferding's addition to this view concerns particularly the 
effects to the formation of cartels and of the monopolization 
process. In Hilferding's view, cartels are unable to alter the 
competition for investment spheres, hence they cannot prevent 
the emergence of disproportionalities. Furthermore, cartels 
prevent prices from dropping and thereby aggravate disturbances 
in the regulation operated by the price system, which in turn 
lead to disproportionalities. This is said to occur also because 
cartels put up with crisis situations by reducing production. 
Cutbacks in production imply an interruption of investments and 
the maintenance of high prices, making the effect of the crisis 
more serious to non-cartelized or less cartelized sectors and 
producing as a result a widening of the disproportionalities. 
In his second conception of the causes of crises, 
Hilferding emphasizes the effects of technical progress and of 
the increase in the organic composition of capital as a whole 
on the rate of profit. However, his argument is rather brief
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and situates overproduction crises merely as -a point in the 
cyclic movements of capitalist economy while failing to account 
for their nature. In this conception disproportionalities become 
simply and indispensable element of the manifestation of crises 
at the level of competition, without which they could not become 
effective. The relationship between his levels of analysis, how- 
ever - the movement of a fall in the rate of profit in the econ- 
omy as a whole and the movement of sectorial disproportionalities 
- remains unexplained. 
‘ 
In his treatment of crises Hilferding makes hodge-podge 
of two heterogeneous themes. This hinders him from distinguishing 
general crises or crises of absolute overproduction from partial 
crises or crises of relative Overproduction. Partial crises are 
related to the process whereby market prices for individual 
commodities are regulated by (re) production prices, in which 
supply and demang interact and competition among capitals operates 
toward establishing an average rate of profit, These movements 
_ relative overproduction. Proportionate production is always the 
result of disproportionate Production. In this sense, Hilferding's 
references to the need for uniformity in the Movement of prices. 
of different commodities represent a misunderstanding. 
matter of fact, 
As a 
the very inequality in the movement of the or : sue : : : ganic composition of capital in different sectors,as discussed by Hilferding, implies the existence of continuous alterations in relative prices. This condition of uniformity is valia only for the examination of the formal conditions of the process of reproduction and circulation of Capital as a whole. Reproduction 
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schemes have been conceived of by Marx at a very high level of 
abstraction, hence they deliberately ignore many of the character- 
istics of capitalist reality, such as, the average- rate of profit, 
production prices which diverge from direct prices, foreign trade, 
ete. To claim that the non-fulfillment of the requirement of 
uniformity in the movement of prices represents per se a causal 
element in generating a crisis of disproportionaly is to be unaware 
of the very mechanism through which proportionality is reached. 
Hilferding appears, therefore, to ignore the fact that propor- 
tionaly among the different spheres of production flows from the 
process of a continuous disproportionality on the basis of 
competition among capitals. This misunderstanding arises from an 
attempt to mechanically apply the conclusions drawn from Marx's 
abstract formulation of the schemes of reproduction directly to 
the analysis, or rather to the concrete process that take place 
in the real world of capitalist production. 
Hilferding is consequently wrong in asserting that 
general crises result from partial crises or crises of relative 
overproduction. It is indeed a fact that in general crises 
absolute overproduction begins to manifest itself as an over- 
production of the main commodities and branches of production. 
However, those general crises are a phenomenon of an altogether 
distinct nature enveloping technical progress, the increase in 
the organic composition of capital as a whole, the increase in 
labor force productivity, and the drop in profitability. Thereby 
a fall in the pace ov investment and generalized problems of 
realization of surplus value is promoted. For this reason, 
Hilferding's argument that those general overproduction crises
20 
necessarily manifest themselves through sectorial dispropor- 
tionalities cannot be accepted either. The simultaneous occur- 
rence of absolute overproduction, bringing about the collapse 
of the capitalist system and of partial overproduction,is possible 
and points to the simultaneous presence of the result of two dif- 
ferent self-regulating methanism in the system, except that in 
the case of a general crisis the very existence ana historical 
continuity of the system are at stake. 
Thus, in either of his two conceptions about the causes 
of crises Hilferding deviates from a conception of capital ac- 
cumulation governed by the contradictory character of its 
endogenous laws such as expressed in the general law of capitalist 
accumulation and the law of a tendential fall in the rate of 
profit. 
In contrast with Hilferding, who saw in the diffusion 
of monopolies only a factor aggravating crises, Steindl (1976) 
presents a theory of capital accumulation and crises that is 
in 
Steindl complies with Baran 
_ decisively based upon the notion of oligopoly ana excess 
Productive capacity. In this way, 
and Sweezy's (1966) requirements according to wich the diffusion 
of monopolies implies a qualitative change in the laws of 
rather than merely a quantitative one as in the case 
of Hilferding's theory, 
capitalism, 
| 
According to Steind1 (1976, chapters Ix, X, and XIv) 
the cri i i i 
ises of capitalism in the twentieth century originates in the diffusion of Cligopolistic market structures Oli 1 . gopoly 
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diffusion is said to imply a reduction in the degree of competi- 
tion, i.e., a weakening of the intensity in the struggle for 
different markets, as a result os which the profit margin and 
the rate of profit would increase. However, given that the demand 
for consumption goods would not increase, the additional resouces 
obtained wuold be invested in non-utilized productive capacity 
(at the level of economy as a whole rather than sectorially, as 
in Hilferding) and thus give rise to problems of realization of 
accumulated profits. 
An alternative mentioned by Steindl would be the 
investment of those additional resources in a modification of 
the structure of capital, thereby solving the problems of reali- 
zation of surplus value as increased by oligopolies. HOwever, 
that alternative is disregarded on the grounds that the intensi- 
fication of capital utilization would cause a fall in the rate 
of profit, something that capitalists seek to avoid at all costs. 
The increase in the rate of accumulation is thus translated 
into an overproduction of capital with formerly existing proeduc- 
tion methods, generating undesirable excesses in productive 
capacity. Those excesses in capacity tend to be eliminated by’ 
competition among capitals, but owing to the growth of oligopoly 
itself, Competition is continually less operative, allowing excesses in 
capacity to persist for a long while without causing their 
elimination. Those undersirable excesses in capacity are then 
said to bring about a depressing influence upon capitalists' decisions 
concerning investment, with a resulting decline in the rate of 
accumulation.
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necessarily manifest themselves through sectorial dispropor- 
tionalities cannot be accepted either. The simultaneous occur- 
rence of absolute overproduction, bringing about the collapse 
of the capitalist system and of partial overproduction,is possible 
and points to the simultaneous presence of the result of two dif- 
ferent self-regulating mechanism in the system, except that in 
the case of a general crisis the very existence and historical 
continuity of the system are at stake. 
Thus, in either of his two conceptions about the causes 
of crises Hilferding deviates from a conception of capital ac- 
cumulation governed by the contradictory character of its 
endogenous laws such as expressed in the general law of capitalist 
accumulation and the law of a tendential fall in the rate of 
profit, 
In contrast with Hilferding, who Saw in the diffusion 
of monopolies only a factor aggravating crises, Steindl (1976) 
presents a theory of capital accumulation ana crises that is 
in 
Steindl complies with Baran 
_ decisively based upon the notion of Oligopoly and excess 
productive Capacity. In this way, 
and Sweezy's (1966) requirements according to wich the diffusion 
of monopolies implies a qualitative change in the 
capitalism, 
laws of 
Yather than Merely a quantitative one as in the case 
of Hilferding's theory, 
‘According to Steindl (1976, chapters IX, X, and XIv) , the cri i i Ses of capitalism in the twentieth century originates in th : : : soa e diffusion of Cligopolistie market structures. Oligopoly 
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diffusion is said to imply a reduction in the degree of competi- 
tion, i.e., a weakening of the intensity in the struggle for 
different markets, as a result os which the profit margin and 
the rate of profit would increase. However, given that the demand 
for consumption goods would not increase, the additional resouces 
obtained wuold be invested in non-utilized productive capacity 
(at the level of economy as a whole rather. than sectorially, as 
in Hilferding) and thus give rise to problems of realization of 
accumulated profits. 
An alternative mentioned by Steindl would be the 
investment of those additional resources in a modification of 
the structure of capital, thereby solving the problems of reali- 
zation of surplus value as increased by oligopolies. HOwever, 
that alternative is disregarded on the grounds that the intensi- 
fication of capital utilization would cause a fall in the rate 
of profit, something that capitalists seek to avoid at all costs. 
The increase in the rate of accumulation is thus translated 
into an overproduction of capital with formerly existing produc- 
tion methods, generating undesirable excesses in productive 
capacity. Those excesses in capacity tend to be eliminated by 
competition among capitals, but owing to the growth of oligopoly 
itself, competition is continually less operative, allowing excesses in 
Capacity to persist for a long while without causing their 
elimination. Those undersirable excesses in capacity are then 
said to bring about a depressing influence upon capitalists' decisions 
concerning investment, with a resulting decline in the rate of 
accumulation,
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Grounded on that reasoning, Baran and Sweezy (1966) 
identify a need for exogenous measures to overcome the gap in 
aggregated demand originating in monopoly capital's tendency 
toward overproduction. They then offer their interpretation of 
a number of phenomena in contemporary Capitalism, such as, the 
state’s civil and military expenditures, expenses for propagan- 
da and conspicuous consumption, 
ism. These would be compensatory forces to offset monopoly cap- 
ital's tendency to overproduction. 
As a general result, the theory of monopoly capital 
implies a complete abrogation of the endogenous laws of capital 
movement. Instead of a tendential fall in the rate of profit , 
there is a tendency to an increase in the mass of profits which 
finds no endogenous possibilities of realization 
We have already seen how the law of value is virtually 
displaced as the central element in the process of price fo rma~ 
tion. This flows from the conception that the Processes of 
, capital concentration and centralization cause 4 progressi ssive elimination of competition, thereby turning the fixati 10n of 
prices into a process that is eith er regulated or man. aged by financial capitalists, Another central aspect in t 
of price determination (in this Specific case t 
-i 
hat process 
determining the necessary existence of idle cap. acity i 
spheres of production - is transformed int Y in different 
° 
of a presumed excess of ac empirical evidence 
cumulation of ; 
capital asa : wh ductive capacity reserves, which are nornal Ole. Pro- 
rmal owin J to the forcible 
« 
  
foreign investments and imperial-   
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articulation between enterprises and independent production branches, 
are thus transformed into evidence of redundant productive 
capacity at the level of the economy as a whole, a capacity that 
should be utilized by manipulation the exogenous factors of demand. 
The abrogation of the general endogenous laws of capital 
“movement takes place, moreover, because the capitalist stimulus to 
increase the production of surplus value by every means available, 
particularly by the growing mechanization of industry, which is 
inherent to the labor process and the concept of capital, simply 
disappears from Steindl's and Baran & Sweezy‘s analyses. The 
tendency to mechanization is a first-order factor that, independ- 
ently of competition among capitals, conditions technical progress 
and sets the limits to the process of capital accumulation. 
Furthermore, competition among capitalists - which is a second- 
~-order facter in the mechanization process and acts in the sense 
of sorting out and selecting those alternatives in technological 
innovation that may be translated into lower costs, hence into 
effective weapons in the competitive struggle - is increasingly 
less operative as a stimulus to the process of capital accumula- 
tion as a result of the diffusion of oligopoly. 
The general result to which we are led by the theory 
of monopoly capital is a tendency to the stagnation of capital 
accumulation and crises of realization, which can be overcome 
only by the manipulation of exogenous factors in aggregated 
demand, where the state occupies a central position. As we shall 
see below the displacement of the contradictions that are 
inherent to the capitalist mode of production into the strict
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sphere of political activity is another common link between 
Hilferding's theory and its contemporary versions, 
A central aspect of the theory developed by Hilferding, and one which was even projected in his intellectual ana political activities in the years following the publication of Finance 
Capital, is the contradiction between the theories of capital accum i isi 
Mlation and cris s and the theory of the processes of capital concentration and centralization. 
As we have seen, 
Capi i pital that monopolies aggravate crises in capitalism. In the fift 
i 
ho and last part of his book (The Economic Policy of Finance 
Capital), where he discusses the problems of national and inter- National conjunctures, the development of finance capital is 
associated to an intensification in the struggle for power among 
Surviving capitalists, Political power ana state support become 
increasingly decisive factors in the competitive struggle. Dis- 
putes among Capitalists, in their turn, transcend national 
_ borders, each country's finance capital seeking to develop nation~ al policies designed to expand their economic Scope as well as 
defend the territory already under control, Among the major 
nation states, 
  
Hilferding argues in Part IV of Finance 
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also aggravate rhe system's contradictions. In the economic shpere 
finance capital contributes to an inerease in the incidence of 
sectorial disproporcionalities, thus strengthening: the tendency 
to the appearance of crises. In the political sphere, the in- 
creasing evidence of a reduction in the class of large capitalists 
contributes to heighten class consciousness in a growing mass of 
workers. 
In the final part of his book Hilferding thus assrts 
that the development of finance capital proceeds in the direction 
of a violent clash between nation states, stimulating a unprec- 
edented increase in poverty and social unpheavals of a revolu- 
tionary nature. Hilferding next argues that the proletariat's 
response to such circumstances should be socialism, the organi- 
zation of production, and the conscious control of economy by 
and for the benefit of society at large. However, he feels that 
this process of overcoming capitalism may have a slow maturation , 
throught the labor class control over the state apparatus. For 
the socialization of production has already heen largely car- 
ried out by finance capital's control over the more important 
production spheres. Therefore, rather than proposing a revolu- 
tionary transformation of the capitalist mode ‘of production, 
Hilferding favors its reform so as to gradually transform cap- 
italism into socialism. 
According to Shaikh (1985), these political in favor 
the evolution and reform of capitalism, in spite of Hilferding's 
theory of crises his conjunctural analysis, are mode 
possible in the context of Finance Capital, thanks
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to the fact that Hilferding separates the laws of 
capitalism from the laws of capital. Such separation flows 
from his conception of the state as an independent and neutral    
    
     




capitalists to workers. In rejecting the notion that the cap - 
Jitalist society's economic structure ultimately dominates 
political and legal relationships, Hilferding rejects the notion 
of the capitalist state as a class state. In so doing he can 
be said to be rejecting the very notion of mode of production. 
Lenin's criticism of the concept of state could then have been 
the one that allowed him to make an extensive use of Hilferding's 
arguments,while at the same time reaching radically different 
political conclusions. 4 
The tendency of finance capital to aggravate the 
contradictions in the Capitalist systems, as expressed by eco- |   nomic crises and in the clash between different nation states, 
however, does not correspond to the rationale of Hilferding's 
ana lysis of the Processes of capital concentration and central - 
.ization.A central topic in his analysis of such processes is t : : : he increasing economic and social control exercised by 
monopol i P es and finance capital. Separately viewed, his analysis: 
presented in the first three parts of Finance Capital emphasizes 
the consei 20US regulation of Production to be exercised by a en g eral cartel ana 4 central bank, This implies denying existence of insi an intrin c tendency toward economic crise System domi sina 
ominated by finance Capital, as well as denying the t endency to a confrontation 
between 
of fi nance capital and their respective 
states   
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What happens, however, is that both in his analysis 
of crises and in his political analysis Hilferding succeeded 
in avoiding the logical conclusion that a sufficient degree of 
cartelization and development of finace capital at the national 
and international levels would reduce the probability of 
sectorial disproportionalities, economic crises, and armed 
clashes between nation states. The formation of a general cartel 
and the unification of the different national segments of finance 
capital were thus transformed into a very remote possibility. 
As a corollary, Hilferding managed in Finance Capital to evade 
the conclusion that monopolies do indeed render capitalism more 
manageable. 
As we have observed, however, his theory of the causes 
of crises in either of its two versions does not succeed in 
adequately grounding the need for general crises in capitalism. 
In the first version partial crises may eventually become general 
crises of absolute overproduction. In the second one, dispropor- 
tionalities are viewed as simple manifestations of general crises 
deriving from the cyclic evolution of capitalsit economy, whose 
features, however, are not duly clarified. This hesitation in the 
theory of crises, as well as the contradictory character of his 
analyses of crises and of the processes of capital concentration 
and centralization, such as presented in Finance Capital, are 
later overcome by Hilferding's development of the notion of 
“organized capitalism". 
The notion of “organized capitalism" emerged in the 
historical period following 1918, when Hilferding became a 
leader in Germany's Social Democracy which held power through a coalition in 
the Weimar Republic (1918-1933) 6 With his notion of "organized
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capit * pitalism" Hilferding definitively abandoned the notion of 
general i Crises as a necesary feature of capitalist dynamics, the atter,.i 
i r-in turn, coming to be conceived of as a force pushing in the directi on of a benign, peaceful, and enrichening develop- ment of human Society, if properly Managed by a socialist and democratically-orienteg state 
Bottomo re (1981) sums up Hilferding's conception of " organized Capitalism" 
in the following words: 
"This conception in 
first, that modern 
had 
volved three main elements: 
Succeeded ~ capitalism at the national 
level 
Nance of the 1a aS a result of the economic 
domi- 
the change celats Corporation and the banks 
and 
State, which h ation of the bourgeoisie to 
the 
in the econo a led to extensive state intervention 
into econonic. ~ 4n introducing a degree of planning 
SPread, to so life; second, that such planning had 
economy, with « extent, into 
the international 
relations bet the consequence that the 
postwar 
come to be chasne Capitalist nation states 
had 
- 4 "realistic racterized, in Hilferding's view, 
by 
development hee sam: and third, that these 
ad necessarily altered the relation 
; "3 class to the state. on this last 
Hilferding argued that, in the new demo- 
stem of the Weimar Republic, the task of 
"9 Class was to extend democracy bY 




reformi : . 
tion or the educational system and the administra 
Justice, reduci esi- u the pr dent of the Reich Faire Powers OF and providing real opportunities 
he people to participate in 
nd at the same time to use its 
© transform an economy organized 
© great corporations into one which 
Ontrolled by the democratic 
for the Mass of t¢ 
Political life; a 
Political Power t¢, 
8nd planneg by th 
was Planneg and ¢ 
State” (p.14),7     
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Finance capital is the underlying concept in current 
explanations of how the capitalist mode of production operates 
in the twentieth century. It has attracted significant attention 
mainly through the works of Lenin (1968), Bukharin (1973), 
Sweezy (1976), and Baran and Sweezy (1966). In the case of Baran 
and Sweezy, finance capital has received a more in-depht treat- 
ment and their work stands as the cornerstone of the theory of 
monopoly capital. : 
This paradigmatic characteristic of Hilferding's work 
defines the relevance for its critical examination. In this sense, 
this discussion should be considered as a study of an outstand- 
ing chapter in the history of economic thought. For this reason, 
an analysis of the contemporary works of Sweezy and Baran, as 
well as the contribution of Kalecki and Steindl - which helped 
to give a more robust structure to the analysis of monopoly 
capitalism - were considered outside the scope of this work.® 
For this same reason a systematic examination of the links 
between Hilferding's work and contemporary versions of monopoly 
capital theory have received only cursory treatment, perforce 
limited to a few specific aspects. 
The conclusions reached in this paper suggest 
a further step - a critical examination of the contemporary 
models of monopoly capitalism. This examination has already 
been initiated by some authors, thereby developing a new area 
of critical work in political economy. ? 
In drowing this conclusion,it is in order to 
consider a brief methodological observation about Fiannce 
Capital. In this work Hilferding demonstrated an enormous 
creativity in conceptually appropriating and synthetizing the
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complex realities of a specific historical period in capitalism. 
However, given the superficial character of his elaboration of theo- 
retical concepts, the passage from the more abstract categories 
to the more concrete ones is made in auch a way that the limits 
of variation in the concrete and more complex forms are not 
Clearly established. Monopoly, which is an actual expression of 
capitalist competition, is thus perceived as something opposite, 
which dines the essence ’ o£ competition itself. Corpo- 
rations and financial groups, which are an actual expression of 
‘Capital development in the form of interest-bearing. capital, are 
perceived as a dominance of banking capital over industrial 
capital and as the negation of the private character of capitalist 
Property. The increasing subordination and widening ‘of the state's 
Zz 
2 2 functions as a capitalist state are perceived as a separation ~ 
of the state from the laws governing the movement of 
the capitalist mode of productin. As a corollary, this process 
of conceptual appropriation of the new forms translates itself 
into an abandonment of the very essence of the phenomenon that 
is being interpreted. The new forms, incorrectly interpreted as 
_they are, become a new substance, 
The incorporation of new forms into the theory, i.e., 
the appropriation of reality by increasingly complex concepts, .. 
is indispensable for the development of a critical view of poli- 
tical economy. However, the concretization of abstract concepts 
is not a Scientifically neutral procedure. Concretization is 
guided by the practical application of the knowledge being 
generated. In this sense, the concept of finance capital as 
formulated by Hilferding cannot be dissociated from his social. 
Practice as a theorist and leader of European Social Democracy 
during the first three decades of the twentieth century.   
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FOOT NOTES 
(1) Baran and Sweezy (1968), p.5. 
(2) See Shaikh (1981, 1982). 
(3) Jacoby (1975). 
(4) See Shaikh (1985).0n the first page of Imperialism, the 
Highest Stage ofCapitalism, in a reference to Finance Cap- - 
ital,Lenin (1968) points out that "In spite of the author's 
mistake regarding the theory of money, and in spite of a cer- 
tain inclination to reconcile Marxism and opportunism, this 
work affords a very valuable theoretical analysis of the 
latest phase of capitalist development, as the subtitle of 
Hilferding's book reads. 
(5) See Shaikh (1985). At the end of chapter 20 Hilferding points 
out (p. 297} that "In itself, a general cartel which carries 
on the whole of production,and thus eliminates crises, is 
economically conceivable, but in social and political terms 
such an arrangement is impossible, because it would inevitably 
come to grief in the conflict of interests which it would in~ 
tensify to an extreme point". 
(6) Concerning Hilferding's public life as an intellectual, poli- 
tician, and economist, see Edinger (1956), Sweezy (1973), 
Bottomore (1981), Rabinbach (1983), and Hajed (1985), among others. 
At the end of the 1981 edition of Finance Capital Bottomore 
has listed a series of works about Hilferding's life and work.° 
(7) See also the article "The organized economy”, originally pub~ 
lished by Hilferding in 1927. See Hilferding (1983). 
(8) In the case of Kalecki (1939 , 1943 and 1954), one of the most 
relevant aspects is his introduction of the concept of "degree 
of monopoly" in the analysis of the capital accumulation proc- 
esses. Sweezy (1977) argues that as a result of the continuous 
increase of the "degre of monopoly", surplus value should pro- 




cenraking a permanent tendency to overaccumulation and stagna- 
ion. i i a This issue is subsequently addressed by Steindl (1952), 
Q@ intended to demonstrate, on the basis of detailed research 
on U.S. i i i S. industrial Structure and performance, how the growth 
monopoly became a "slowing down factor" . in the process of capital accumnlation, 
° 
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